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Abstract
Based on the self-generated attitude change model, a
process constraint treatment analogue was investigated.
Differential treatment effects were explored for people that
are verbalizers and visualizers.

It was predicted that

people who participated in the process constraint condition
would benefit more if they were verbalizers than
visualizers.

It was also predicted that there would be no

difference in effects for people in the control condition.
To test these predictions, people with a fear of speaking in
public were asked to speak in front of a small group.

The

effects of the treatment conditions were assessed using
self-report, behavioral, and physiological measures of fear.
Results supported the predictions on the behavioral and
physiological measures, but only in part on the self-report
measures. Implications of these results are discussed as
well as directions for future research.
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What is Self-Generated Attitude Change?
Traditionally, changes in attitude have been
conceptualized as a response to outside information
(i.e., from the environment).

A new focus of attitude

change has questioned the assumption that changes in
attitude usually results from external sources or from the
environment.

It is entirely possible that these changes

arise from a reassessment of one's attitudes regardless of
the addition of new facts

(Tesser, 1978).

The process for

this self-generated change in attitude would be simply
thinking about an object.
The idea of self-generated attitude change stems from
(a) the relationship between beliefs and attitudes and (b)
the effects of thought on beliefs or beliefs.

A belief can

be looked at as an impression or an idea about an object.
An attitude can be thought of as an appraisal of a
particular object or feelings connected with the object. An
operational definition of attitudes "involves asking the
person to assign the object of thought to a position on some
dimension of judgement ••. dimensions can be thought of as
evaluations"

(McGuire 1985, p. 239). Tesser (1978) felt that

a person's attitude is partially determined by their
beliefs. Therefore, changes in one's beliefs would result
in a change of attitude.
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Basically, the process that links beliefs and
attitudes is thought. The way in which people think about
their beliefs and ideas can change their attitudes.
(1978) stated

Tesser

"thought does not involve a passive view of a

static object but, rather, a dynamic process which alters
the salient cognitive representation of that object" (p.
330) .

Thought tends to make

consistent.
more

beliefs evaluative1y

If thought will cause a person's beliefs to be

congruent, then this process would

feelings about an object.
polarization of feelings

affect one's

This change in affect is a
(i.e., favorable attitudes become

more favorable, and unfavorable attitudes become more
unfavorable).
Thus, increased thought should generally change beliefs
to be more consistent. With additional thought, feelings
that are initially positive should become more positive and
feelings that are initially negative should become more
negative.

In a study by Sadler and Tesser (1973), the

effects of thought on affect were examined.

Subjects were

exposed to a "likeable" or "dislikeable" person (p. 101).
Their attitude or impression toward this person became more
extreme if they were given time to think
distracted.

rather than being

The strengthening of their initial feelings

occurred for both positive and negative feelings.

Assuming

that beliefs about an object can affect attitudes because of
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introspective examination, it follows that feelings will
become more polarized or extreme the longer a person
reflects about an object.

Tesser and Conlee (1975) found

that the longer a person thought about an object or issue in
the absence of any external information, the more polarized
their feelings became toward the object.

How Thought Effects Beliefs
Given that thought causes polarization of one's
evaluation or affect, knowing how it occurs becomes
important.

Different hypotheses have been suggested to

explain the manner in which thought influences beliefs. One
explanation is the "generation" hypothesis which dictates
that a person can add new beliefs to be congruous with the
existing beliefs

(Sadler & Tesser, 1973, p. 101).

Sadler and Tesser study, subjects

In the

given time to think about

their partner (whether the partner was likable or not)
tended to list more attitude consistent beliefs than did
those subjects that were not given a chance to reflect on
their attitudes.
Further evidence for the generation hypothesis was
demonstrated in the Tesser and Cowan study (1975) on
impression formation.

They set up conditions in which it

would be difficult or easy to generate new beliefs.

Their

reasoning was that it would be more difficult to generate
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new consistent beliefs given many initial trait adjectives
than given few trait adjectives. Thus, a greater amount of
polarization of feelings was expected with few initial trait
adjectives that with many initial trait adjectives.

The

results of this study showed that given time to think about
a person, polarization was much higher when there were few
initial trait adjectives
adjectives.

compared with many initial trait

Overall, there seems to be much evidence that

points toward the generation hypothesis.
The "reinterpretation" hypothesis is another
explanation of the process by which thought alters beliefs
and, in turn, alters affect (Tesser & Cowan, 1977, p. 217).
Tesser and Cowan created treatment conditions that contained
ambiguous trait adjectives.

An ambiguous trait adjective

was one in which there could be a wide range of meanings.
While musing over different alternatives, ambiguous trait
adjectives can be reinterpreted
other trait adjectives.

to be more consistent with

The results of this study showed

that ambiguous adjectives were judged more positively when
in a positive set of descriptions and were judged more
negatively when in a negative set of descriptions. Thus,
when given an ambiguous situation people may reinterpret
their beliefs, thereby polarizing their feelings.
An additional possibility suggested by Tesser (1978) is
a blocking process in which inconsistent beliefs are

Process Constraint
5

suppressed. More specifically,

an individual may discount

or discard any information that does not seem congruous with
their particular line of reasoning.

Stated another way, a

rejection of inconsistent beliefs can result in a set of
beliefs that are evaluatively consistent.
However, the thought process of each individual is
idiosyncratic. Thus there could be many other processes
possible.

In general, thinking about an issue, idea or

object can result in a group of beliefs which are
evaluatively consistent.

Under What Conditions Does Polarization Occur?
Thought has now been linked to altering people's
beliefs which in turn can polarize attitudes or affect.
However, most of the aforementioned studies were performed
in the absence of any external information, in a vacuum of
sorts.

Without any external information, there remains

little chance of people testing the validity of their
beliefs.
If the object of people's thought is present, people
can realistically assess their beliefs.

Moreover, people

would probably adapt their beliefs to reflect the

object.

Having the object present serves as a "reality constraint"
because the chances of misrepresentation are reduced
(Tesser, 1976, p.184).

Placing a reality constraint on
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people restricts the extent to which beliefs can be
generated, reinterpreted, or discounted. In contrast, the
absence of an object would allow people to polarize their
affect because there would not be any evidence in which to
check the validity of their beliefs.
Tesser (1976) looked at the effects of reality
constraints on attitudes about paintings.

Subjects were

asked how they felt about various paintings two times.

In

between these evaluations, some subjects were instructed to
perform a distraction task to decrease the amount of thought
that could be done.

Other subjects were asked to think

about a painting without it being displayed.

A third group

was asked to think about a painting while it was displayed.
The results for the female subjects showed the most
amount of polarization occurring in the condition in which
the object was absent.

The condition with the painting

present produced less polarization than the condition in
which it was absent.

The least amount of polarization was

in the condition in which subjects performed a distraction
task.

Thus, the results were consistent with the idea that

reality constraints tends to reduce affect by limiting the
consistency of the beliefs.

That is, thought causes beliefs

to be more consistent and subsequently cause attitudes to be
more extreme.

Alternatively, by constraining thought,

beliefs become somewhat ambivalent.

The result is reduced
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attitude extremity or attitude polarization.
In addition to reality constraints "process
constraints" have been found to reduce polarization of
feelings

(Tesser, 1978, p. 326).

Reality constraints

originate from obvious evidence about the object or external
information.

Process constraints, on the other hand,

originate from internal information (i.e., standards and
rules).

A process constraint requires people to examine the

origins of their beliefs.

The idea underlying process

constraints is that people attempt to be rational.

When

people are asked to explicitly state the origins of their
beliefs, they might discover there are inconsistencies.

If

while looking at the derivations of their beliefs people
find some irrational beliefs, they would probably adjust
their beliefs to be more rational.
beliefs become more inconsistent or

As a result, these
ambivalent. Some of

the intensity of the affect associated with the beliefs is
reduced.

(i.e., a decrease in polarization occurs).

Clinical Applications
How does the idea of attitude change relate to clinical
problems?

Consider, for example, phobias.

Some of the

criterion for social phobias the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual III-R includes are: exposure to the specific phobic
stimulus provokes immediate anxiety, phobic situation is
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avoided or endured with intense anxiety, and the person
recognizes that the fear is excessive or unreasonable
(1987).

Also, there is a persistent fear of one or more

situations in which a person is exposed to possible scrutiny
by others and fears s/he may do something or act in a way
that will be humiliating or embarrassing.
In some ways, a phobia is like an attitude.

When

experiences are unpleasant or negative, people will
probably attempt to avoid the whole situation or object.
Without any more exposure to the stimulus, people will not
have any reality checks to assess the rationality of their
beliefs.

In other words, the more people think about the

negative aspects of an experience the fearful they may
become.

People's beliefs will become increasingly

consistent yet irrational and their feelings become
polarized (i.e., extremely negative).

In sum, the

development of phobias can be thought of in terms of self
generated attitude change. That is, in the absence of
contact with the object and with increased thought, phobic
reactions can emerge.
Hypothesizing about the development of phobias in terms
of self-generated attitude change has implications for
intervention.

Process constraints could be utilized by

simply asking a person about the origin of the phobia and
the rationale behind it.

In this way, a person might
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realize that the basis of his fear is not thoroughly logical
or rational.

These beliefs will be discredited, thereby

reducing the exaggerated affect associated with it (i.e.,
reducing the polarized negative feelings). In many studies,
process constraints have been examined for use in
ameliorating phobias.

Constrained Thought vs. Unconstrained Thought
One of the original experiments that studied process
constraints was done by Tesser, Leone, and Clary (1978).
Their study concentrated on women with a fear of public
speaking.
conditions:

The subjects were given one of three treatment
a condition that utilized process constraints,

one that had an affective focus, or a control condition.
In the process constraint condition, the experimenter
asked the subject to concentrate on why she felt
uncomfortable about speaking in public.

For example, "why

do you feel this way ••. in what way are these beliefs
logically related to your emotions, past experiences ••• " (p.
269).

In the affective focus condition, women were asked

what emotions they felt when speaking in public.
example, "

For

we're not concerned with why you feel this

way, but how you feel •.• " (p, 270). In the control
condition, subjects were asked to perform a task in which
they indicated anxiety levels on particular topics.
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After a five minute relaxation exercise, the
participants were asked to speak to the other subjects twice
about a particular topic. After each speech,
measures were taken:

three

a self report measure, a behavioral

measure and a physiological response. On the self report,
subjects were asked questions about their emotions, their
performance, and pleasantness of the experience.

They were

also asked of how they usually felt after a performance
compared to the present and their opinion of the
effectiveness of the treatment.

The behavioral measure was

very similar to the self report taken.

The only difference

was that the audience (the other subjects) filled out the
measure in response to the speaker's (the subject's) affect.
The physiological measure was a palmar sweat test.

Sweat

from the subjects' index finger on their dominant hand was
measured just before and just after the talk.
The self-reports revealed the anxiety level in the
process condition to be the lowest of any conditions.

The

control condition was next, and the affective condition
produced the most anxiety.

Using the physiological

responses, arousal for the subjects in the process condition
was

the lowest.

The control condition was not much higher,

but the affective condition was again very high.

The

behavioral component showed no variability between the
conditions, probably due to the inconsistency of audience
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judgement.
These results confirm much of the hypothesized effects
of process constraints.

Searching for the origins of

people's thought tended to reduce their fear of public
speaking.

Essentially, through examination and constriction

of their irrational beliefs, the subjects' associated affect
was "depolarized."

In contrast, the anxiety levels of the

affective condition was closely aligned with the self
generated attitude change model.

Focusing on the affect

tended to increase the subjects feeling of fear instead of
reducing the anxiety.

In part, this polarization occurred

by not allowing a more corrective cognitive experience.
Much like the results of Tesser (1976) subjects affect was
"depolarized" when thinking about the reality of their
beliefs.
The results of this study have been replicated in other
studies (Leone,

1984~

Baltimore, 1983).

Leone & Baldwin,

1983~

Leone, Minor, &

Combinations of constrained thought have

been utilized (i.e., process and reality constraints
together).

The combination of process and reality

constraints seemed to increase approach behavior to the
feared stimulus and increase self efficacy.

Also, the

longer people thought with reality and process constraints
about the feared stimulus the more strongly they believed
they would be able to cope with their fears in the future.
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The results of these studies were found with

different

fears, different dependent variables, and different
settings.

For example, both fear of speaking in front of a

group and fear of snakes have been tested.

Also, several

dependent variables such as behavioral approach (Lang &
Lozovik, 1963), self-efficacy, and physiological arousal
have been utilized.

In addition, different studies have

utilized different experimenters and different locations.
Assimilating all these results, it seems that
constrained thought and unconstrained thought can be seen to
be a linear process.

Thinking in a manner that restricts

exaggerated beliefs decreases anxiety.

Thinking in a manner

that allows exaggerated thought to become more consistent
and extreme can increase anxiety.

In sum, constrained

thought is associated with the reduction of anxiety, and
unconstrained thought can be associated with an increase in
anxiety.

Individual Differences
Thus far, studies have also shown that placing
constraints on people's thought processes decreases the
extent to which people can make their beliefs consistent
(Leone et al.,

1983~

Tesser et al., 1978).

Consequently,

constraints reduce people's polarized feelings.

Given that

thought is the key to polarized feelings, the concept of

Process Constraint
13
individual styles of thought becomes important.
Individual differences in cognitive style could affect
the efficacy of treatment outcomes.

The ultimate goal for

clinical and research purposes is to match individual styles
to appropriate treatments for the most effective results
possible.

"Aptitude-treatment interaction is directed

toward identifying client variables that predict
differential treatment responsiveness ••• the most research on
client type by treatment interactions have been conducted
with the anxiety disorders"
194).

(Dance & Neufeld, 1988 p. 192-

Several individual difference variables have been

examined.

Dance and Neufeld cite over twenty studies

completed that investigate various individual differences
that can affect treatment outcomes.

In addition, Carrol and

Maxwell (1979) review many individual differences within
cognitive abilities.
Verbal and Visual Cognitive Styles
One variable that has been studied is verbal and visual
styles of thinking.

Generally, it is assumed that people

have a style or preference that dominates their way of
thinking.

Katz points out that "due to one's learning

history one acquires a preference to use imagery regardless
of task type ••• a predisposition or bias regardless of signs
regarding the appropriateness of that symbolic system"
(1983, p. 56).

Thus, regardless of the particular
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situation, people will tend to utilize either a verbalizing
or visualizing cognitive style.

Additionally,

Zenhausen

stated "some people always think in images and either cannot
think without them ••• or do so with difficulty.

Other people

have either no visual imagery at all when they think,
or ••• it is merely an accompaniment to their thinking (1978,
p. 381).
Richardson defined a verbal cognitive style as a
"preference for linguistic encoding (labeling or naming) for
reading the instructions on how to do something rather than
someone demonstrating the task ••• experience of inner
speech .•. " (1983, p.12). Richardson defined a preference for
visualizing as " ••• a preference for visual encoding (i.e.,
the spatial layout and physical features) and attention to
the sensory properties of the stimulus (i.e.,
color) ••• experience of inner pictures."
MacInnis and Price differentiate cognitive styles of
processing on a continuum (1987, p. 425).

For verbal

styles, they included factors such as verbal retrieving,
cognitive responding and verbal encoding.

For visual styles

they include factors such as sensory representations of
ideas and feeling.

More specifically, MacInnnis and Price

consider verbalizers to utilize symbolic and language-like
processing for

counter-arguments, attributions, and

compositional choice strategies.

Alternatively, they

Process Constraint

15
consider visualizers to utilize daydreams, fantasies, and
visual problem solving.
Similarly, Pavio and Harshman (1987, pp. 78-79)
describe verbal cognitive styles as "abilities" (i.e.,
fluency and easy of expression, reading ability) and
"attitudes"

(i.e., correctness of verbal expression).

Alternatively, they describe visual cognitive styles as
"habits"

(i.e, dreams, daydreams, and use of images to

solve problems).

To summarize, we can conceptualize

verbalizers as people who utilize verbal representations for
encoding, might be more likely to engage in compositional
problem solving techniques, and express themselves verbally.
We can conceptualize visualizers as people who utilize
sensory representations for encoding, might be more likely
to engage in visual problem solving techniques, and

have

daydreams.
Verbalizing and visualizing cognitive styles

have been

researched with differential treatment effects for anxious
or phobic individuals. Studies have

found that people with

verbalizing cognitive styles gain more from verbally
oriented treatments than people with visualizing cognitive
styles.

That is, treatments such as covert reinforcement

and instructional training which ask people to imagine
things verbally, or to ask people to rely on speech as
stimuli are better for "verbalizers" (Delaney, 1978; Tondo &
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Cautela, 1974; and Vallis & Butcher, 1986).

Other clinical

studies have found that people with visualizing cognitive
styles gain more from visually oriented treatments than
people with verbalizing cognitive styles.

That is,

treatments such as systematic desensitization, the use of
fantasies and covert modeling which ask people to visually
imagine things or to ask people to rely on visual stimuli
are better for "visualizers" (Dyckman & Cowan, 1978; Gold,
Jarvinen, & Teague, 1982; Vallis & Butcher, 1986; Wisocki,
1973).

Basically, treatments that were based on verbal

representations were more effective on verbalizers than on
visualizers.

Similarly, treatments that were based on

visual representations were more effective on visualizers
than on verbalizers.
The treatments that were derived from the selfgenerated attitude change model can be applied to the
verbalizing and visualizing concepts. That is, the
treatments of process constraints would seem to interact
with verbalizing and visualizing cognitive styles.

Looking

closely at the process constraint treatment analogue, it
would be predicted that verbalizers would benefit from this
type of intervention.

With process constraints, people are

asked to explain out loud where they think their beliefs
originate.

Thus, the content of the process constraint

treatment utilizes verbal expression of people's beliefs.
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Therefore, people with verbalizing cognitive styles would
seem to benefit highly from a process constrained treatment.
In contrast, people with visualizing cognitive styles would
not seem to benefit highly from a process constrained
treatment because they utilize visual representations.
For this study, fear of speaking in front of a group
was investigated.

Two main hypothesis were tested.

First,

it was predicted that people who participate in a process
constraint treatment analogue would benefit more if they
were verbalizers than visualizers.

Second it was

hypothesized that there would be no difference in effects
for people in the control condition.

Taking these two

hypothesis into account, it was expected that there would be
an interaction between treatment effects and cognitive
styles.

Process Constraint
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Method
Participants
Undergraduates at the University of North Florida were
recruited for an experiment concerning "people's fears and
thoughts."

Volunteers received extra credit for

participation.

The participants selected had previously

indicated a strong fear of public speaking.

There were 58

participants included in this experiment (60 participated,
but only 58 completed the experiment).

The participants

were randomly assigned to conditions with the restriction
that there were an equal number of verbalizer participants
and visualizer participants in each condition.
Procedure
Assessment of Fear and Cognitive Styles
Geer Survey Schedule.

In an initial screening,

participants were administered an abbreviated version of the
Geer Fear Survey Schedule-II (Geer, 1965).
20-item self-report measure.

The survey is a

Participants were asked to

rate on a 7-point scale their fear of situations or objects.
Participants who reported a strong fear of public speaking
(i.e., a rating of 5, 6, or 7) were chosen for this study.
Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire.

Participants were

also given at an initial screening Richardson's VerbalizerVisualizer Questionnaire (1977).

The Verbalizer-Visualizer

Questionnaire (VVQ) is a IS-item, true-false, self-report
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measure.

The VVQ measures verbalizing-visualizing thinking

styles in individuals.

Participants were asked to indicate

if particular activities (e.g., my thinking often consists
of mental pictures or images, I can easily think of synonyms
for words) are characteristic of them.

Their responses were

summed across all 15 items. Participants chosen for the
study were classified as a verbalizer or visualizer by a
median split of the full range of scores.
Administration of Treatments Analogues
Participants were seen individually for one session.
An experimenter briefly described the procedure and
rationale of the experiment.

The participants were told

that the experiment was designed to assess new types of
treatments for people that have a fear of public speaking.
The experimenter then administered either the process
constraint treatment analogue or the control condition.
Process constraint condition.

In the process

constraint condition, participants were asked to verbalize
for five minutes the reasons for their beliefs about
speaking before a group.

These instructions were similar to

the instructions given in the Tesser et ale

(1978) study.

For example, participants were asked, "Tell me how you feel
emotionally and physically when you are about to give a
speech ••• most importantly, tell me why you feel this
way ••• in terms of past experiences try to concentrate on why

Process Constraint
20

you believe as you do."

The experimenter focused the

participants verbalizations on the derivations of their
beliefs by using probes (e.g., tell me why you think that).
Control condition.

In the control condition,

participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire for five
minutes.

The 100-item questionnaire contained different

issues, objects, and

situations. The participants were

asked to rate on a scale of 1-10 (10 indicating no anxiety
and 1 indicating extreme anxiety) how much anxiety they
believed the average person would experience for these
issues.

If the participants finished before the allotted

five minutes was over, they were asked to review their
answers.
At the end of either treatment condition, participants
underwent a relaxation procedure.

The experimenter first

gave an introduction about the benefits of physical
relaxation.

The experimenter then demonstrated three times

the deep breathing exercise.

Finally, the subjects

participated in the exercise for 3 minutes.

By having both

groups undergo the relaxation exercise, any differences in
fear should be attributed to changes in beliefs rather than
the treatment per se.
Dependent Variables
After the relaxation procedure, the participants were
asked to speak for three minutes to a small group on a
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preselected innocuous topic

(e.g., plans for the summer).

The group consisted of three assistants
experimenter).

(not including the

The range in the ages of the assistants was

equivalent to the range in ages of the participants.

The

assistants were also dressed in the same manner as the
participants

(i.e., casually).

One half the participants

spoke to a group consisting of two females and one male
assistant. The other half of the participants spoke to a
group consisting of one female and two male assistants.

All

the assistants were blind to the treatment condition.
Self-Generated Responses.

Immediately following the

speech, the participants generated four measures of fear.
The questionnaire included three scales designed to assess
the participants' feelings and perceptions about their
speech.

The first scale (measure of fear) asked

participants to indicate how much fear they experienced
while giving the speech.

Ratings were made on

a lOO-point

scale with 5-point increments marked and anchored with the
following labels:

no fear, slight fear, moderate fear,

strong fear, and terror.

The second scale (measure of

behavior) asked participants to rate how well they thought
they were able to give their speech. The ratings were made
on a series of 7-point semantic-differential type scales
(i.e., good/bad, valuable/worthless, pleasant/unpleasant,
positive/negative, nice/awful).

The third scale ( measure
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of beliefs) asked subjects how they might cope with seven
situations involving a speech (e.g., giving an oral report
in front of a 90-person class, being asked to give a
"formal" toast at an acquaintance's wedding, presenting a
project to supervisors at work, giving an eulogy at
someone's funeral, being asked to speak in class without
prior notice, defending ideas in front of a club, giving a
presentation to a civic group).

Participants were asked to

rate how well they thought they would cope with each of
these situations on a lOa-point scale with 5-point
increments with anchors of
cope, able to

unable to cope, barely able to

cope pretty well, and completely able to

cope.
The fourth scale (physiological measure of fear) was
measured during the speech using a method described by
McNair, Droppleman, and Pillard (1967).

Palmar sweat was

measured from the index finger of the participants'
nondominant hand.

A chemically treated paper was wrapped

around their index finger.
Palmar sweat stains the chemically treated papers.

The

depth of the stain is an index of the participants' arousal
(i.e., darker papers indicate higher levels of arousal).

To

score the arousal levels, the palmar sweat papers were
sorted into five categories form lightest to darkest.

There

was an equal number of palmar sweat papers per category.
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Each category was assigned a score of 1-5 corresponding from
the least arousal to the most arousal.
Rater-Generated Responses.

Immediately following the

speech, the three assistants generated three measures of
fear on the participants.

The assistants were trained to

focus to on the participants' non-verbal activity (i.e., eye
contact, posture, facial movements, para-verbal, and body
movements).

After the speech, the assistants rated the

participants' observable fear and performance during the
speech using the three scales described under the self
reported fear.

Appropriate word changes reflected the fact

that the group was rating the participants and not
themselves.

Responses were averaged over each of the three

members of the group for each participant.

Post-experimental interview
After completion of the dependent variables, the
rationale of the experiment was explained to the
participants.

They were given the opportunity to ask and

have answered any questions concerning the experiment.
Participants were asked not to discuss the experiment with
other potential subjects, and then dismissed.
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Results
This experiment utilized a 2 x 2 design.

The

independent variables were treatment condition (analogue
versus control) and cognitive style (verbalizing versus
visualizing).
measures:

Each participant generated four dependent

extra-laboratory beliefs, self-reported fear,

physiological arousal, and self-assessed behavior.

Another

set of dependent measures was obtained from the raters'
assessments of the participants'
laboratory expectations.

fear, behavior, and extra-

All the dependent measures were

assessed immediately following the speech with the exception
of the palmar sweat measure which was assessed during the
speech.

All measures were separately analyzed utilizing a 2

x 2 ANOVA.

Significant interaction effects were further

analyzed by simple main effects analyses.
Subjects-Generated Responses
Beliefs.

For the measure of participants' beliefs

about their ability to cope in extra-laboratory situations,
the interaction between treatment analogue and cognitive
style was not significant,

~

(1, 57)

were, in part, ordered as predicted.

<

1.00.

The means

In the treatment

condition, subjects had higher expectations about their
ability to cope if they were verbalizers (M= 53.22) than if
they were visualizers (M= 48.31).

Contrary to predictions,

subjects in the control condition also had higher
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expectations about their ability to cope if they were
verbalizers
40.51).

(M= 45.90) than if they were visualizers (M=

The difference in the treatment means and the

control means were approximately the same.
Fear.

For the self-report measure of fear, the

interaction between treatment analogue and cognitive style
was not significant, F (1, 57)

<

1.00.

were again ordered as predicted.

However, the means

In the treatment

condition, subjects reported less fear during the speech if
they were verbalizers
visualizers (M= 47.88).

(M= 39.28) than if they were
In the control condition, subjects

reported less fear during the speech, if they were
verbalizers
53.18).

(~=

49.73) than if they were visualizers

(~=

The difference in the treatment means was greater

than the control means.
Palmar Sweat.

For the physiological measure of

arousal, two judges rated the palmar sweat papers. The two
judges scores were

averaged, because the inter-rater

reliability was adequate (r= .97).

For this measure, the

interaction between treatment analogue and cognitive style
was significant, F (1, 57) = 7.95, p,< .01.

In the

treatment condition, subjects were less aroused during the
speech if they were verbalizers
visualizers (M =3.67).
significant,

(M=2.75) than if they were

This difference is only marginally

F (1, 57) = 3.41,

~<

.07.

In the control
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condition, subjects palmar sweat measure indicated they were
less nervous if they were visualizers (M= 2.04) than
verbalizers (3.13), F (1, 57) = 4.84,
Behavior.

~

<

.05.

For the self-assessment measure of

performance, the interaction between treatment analogue and
cognitive style was not significant, F (1, 57) ~ 1.0.
However, the means were, in part, ordered as predicted.

In

the treatment condition, subjects assessed their performance
to be better if they were verbalizers (M= 22.71) than if
they were visualizers

(M= 21.78).

Contrary to expectations,

subjects in the control condition also assessed their
performance to be better if they were verbalizers (M= 21.63)
than if they were visualizers

(M= 20.64).

The difference in

the treatment means and the control means were
approximately the same.
Rater-Generated Responses
For each rater-generated response, the three raters'
evaluations were combined so that there was one dependent
measure for each participant.

For each measure, inter-rater

reliability was determined by coefficient alpha. To obtain
an overall measure of extra-laboratory beliefs for each
subject, the seven items in the measure were combined within
raters, summed across raters, and then divided by seven
.76).

The measure of fear observed by the raters was

obtained by combining each raters score into one overall

(a=
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score (Q= .83).

To obtain an overall behavioral measure,

the five items' scores for each rater were combined and then
each of the raters' scores was added together (0=.70).
Beliefs.

For the raters' expectations that subjects

would be able to cope with extra-laboratory situations,
there was a significant interaction between treatment
analogue and cognitive style, F (1,57) =5.21,

~

<

.05.

In

the treatment condition, raters expected more effective
coping from verbalizers (M= 206.33) than from visualizers
(~=

156.24),

~

(1,57) = 6.62, p

<

.05.

In the control

condition, there was no significant difference in the
raters' expectations of verbalizers
visualizers
Fear.

(~=

198.05),

~

(1, 57)

(~=

<

184.09) and

1.00.

For the raters' evaluation of the participants'

fear, there was a significant interaction between treatment
analogue and cognitive style, F (1, 57) = 5.67, p

<

.05.

In

the treatment condition, raters judged the subjects' fear to
be lower if they were verbalizers (M= 92.21) than if they
were visualizers (M= 152.50), F (1,57) = 7.40,

~<

.01.

In

the control condition, there was no significant difference
in the raters' evaluation of fear in verbalizers (M=120.05)
and visualizers (M= 104.27), F (1, 57)
Behavior.

<

1.00.

For the raters' evaluations of the subjects'

performance, the interaction between treatment analogue and
cognitive style only approached conventional levels of
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significance, F (1, 57) = 2.65,

~

<

.11.

however, were ordered as predicted.

The means,

In the treatment

condition, raters evaluated the subjects' performance as
better if they were verbalizers (M= 78.64) than visualizers
(~66.35),

~

(1, 57) = 5.01,

~

<

.05.

In the control

condition, there was no significant difference in the
raters' evaluation of verbalizers (M= 70.05) and visualizers
(M=70.64), F (1,57)

< 1.00.
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Discussion
For this study, two main hypothesis were tested.
First, it was hypothesized that participants would benefit
more from treatment if they were verbalizers than
visualizers.

Second, it was hypothesized that there would

be no differences in effects for participants in the control
condition.

Taken together, it was expected that there would

be an interaction between treatment effects and cognitive
styles.
For the subject-generated responses, the means were, in
part, ordered as predicted but did not approach significance
(although the physiological measure was statistically
significant).

That is, the verbalizers in the treatment

condition indicated they had higher expectations about their
ability to cope in extra-laboratory situations and assessed
their performance to be better than visualizers in the
treatment condition.

Additionally, verbalizers in the

treatment condition reported less fear

(from the results of

the physiological measure) and were less nervous during the
speech than visualizers in the treatment condition.
However, there were also differences between the verbalizers
and visualizers in the control group.
For the rater-generated responses, the means were
ordered as predicted and achieved statistical significance.
That is, raters believed that verbalizers in the treatment
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condition would be able to cope better in extra-laboratory
situations, looked less fearful, and performed better than
visualizers in the treatment condition.

For the both the

subject-generated responses and the rater-generated
responses, there were no significant

differences in

verbalizers and visualizers in the control condition.
Alternative Hypothesis
There are many plausible explanations for the
discrepancy between the subjects-generated responses and the
rater-generated responses.

One explanation for this

discrepancy concerns the perspectives of the subjects and
the raters.

For purposes of reference, the subjects had a

very limited perspective on the evaluation of their
performance.

That is, the only comparative analysis they

could utilize for this situation was their past
performances in other situations.

On the other hand, the

raters had a broader perspective on the
performances.

subjects'

That is, the raters saw many participants

speak, perhaps creating a more realistic comparison
reference of subjects' performances.

Thus, it might be

considered that the subjects were "untrained" for their
evaluations.
Another explanation for the discrepancy between the
subject-generated responses and the rater-generated
responses concerns the reliability of the measures.

For any
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one score (i.e., the subject's report or one rater's
report), there is a certain amount of error

involved.

According to the true score model, aggregation of
evaluations would reduce the amount of error involved.

If

so, the summed raters' responses would be more reliable than
the subjects' single responses. Thus, it might be considered
that the rater-generated responses would be a better index
of the treatment effects than the subject-generated
responses.
Finally, another explanation for the discrepancy
between the subjects-generated responses and the ratergenerated responses, is the sample size.

With more

participants, differences in the subjects-generated
responses would perhaps become statistically significant
instead of just approaching significance.

More

participants would add power to the analysis.

Thus, given

that the subjects-generated responses tended to be less
reliable assessments than the raters-generated responses,
adding more subjects might increase the reliability of these
responses.
Theoretical Comparisons
There are many apparent similarities between treatment
analogues from self-generated attitude change and treatments
from other psychological frameworks.

The perspective that

seems to be most similar to the self-generated attitude
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change model is cognitive restructuring. In general,
cognitive restructuring approaches origins of phobias from
the angle that peoples' affect and behavior are based on the
way people cognitively structure their world (Corey, 1986).
Social anxieties are described as "exaggerated fear of being
the focus of attention and devaluation by another person or
persons"

(Beck, 1985 p. 150). Nichols (1974) described some

characteristics of social anxiety such as the perception and
expectation of disapproving or critical regard by others and
a tendency to perceive and respond to criticism from others
which is nonexistent.
Similarly, self-generated attitude change approaches
origins of phobias from the angle that with increased
thought, people's beliefs become increasingly consistent and
their feelings become polarized.

Social anxieties are

described as negative, polarized attitudes that result from
irrational beliefs.

Tesser et. al. stated "that specific

content of people's belief systems differ across persons in
spite of the fact that the derivative process is illogical;
i.e., there are any number of ways to be wrong"

(1978, p.

273) •

There seems to be many procedural similarities as well
as differences in treatments derived from the

cognitive

restructuring model and the self-generated attitude change
model.

In cognitive restructuring, three basic strategies
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or questions are utilized to help people change their
beliefs:

(1)

"What's the evidence?" (2) "What's another way

of looking at the situation?" and (3) "So what if it
happens?" (Beck, 1985 pp. 201-209).
There are many forms of cognitive restructuring.

In

rational emotive therapy (RET), for example, Ellis suggests
that people ask themselves "why would it emerge as terrible
as that ..• would it really seem so awful if ••• " (Ellis, 1975
p. 154).

In one way, this procedure is similar to

constrained thought or process constraints in that both
approaches seem to explore peoples' beliefs.

With process

constraints, however, people are just asked to think about
the derivations of their beliefs rather than with the
inclusion of the "so what if it happens" step.

Also, people

are asked to think about how these beliefs are logically
related to their feelings and arrive at their own
conclusions rather than think in a prescribed step.

For

example, with process constraints, there is not a
"disputing" or "awfu1izing" component which is deemed as
essential in RET (Corey, 1986 p. 220).

With process

constraints, it would be asked why do you think that?

With

RET, it might be asked why is it terrible and horrible if
life is not the way you want it to be?
Another difference between RET and process constraints
is the structure of the interventions.

"RET is highly
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directive,
p. 228).

confrontive ••• and highly didactic" (Corey, 1986
Thus, RET seems to place much control with the

therapist.

In contrast, process constraints seem to place

much more control with the individual.

Therefore, the

subtle nature of the interventions are different.
Another form of cognitive restructuring is the se1finstructional intervention (Meichenbaum, 1977).

Like

process constraints, Meichenbaum's cognitive restructuring
is somewhat self-focused.

People are taught to modify the

negative beliefs or internal dialogue they have within
themselves.

Similarly, with process constraints people are

asked to explore their beliefs.

Also, both treatments

focused on verbalizations of beliefs.
However, Meichenbaum (1977) suggests rehearsing new
dialogues in which the therapist says the dialogue and the
individual just repeats it and then imagines it. The
individual's coping statements are monitored by the
therapist throughout the rehearsal and any mistakes are
corrected by the therapist. Thus, the intervention tends to
be somewhat directive.

With self-generated attitude change,

a change in beliefs decreases fear through the subjects'
focusing on the derivations of their beliefs.
process is increased thought
own

beliefs.

different.

The mediating

by the subjects about their

Thus, the structure of the interventions are

That is, self-instructional interventions are
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much more didactic than process constraint interventions.
Another technique that is

similar to process

constraints is objective countering.

Objective countering

states that "the client's beliefs can be changed if the
therapist helps accumulate more logic against a thought than
the client has in support of

it~

when the logical evidence

tips the scales the beliefs will shift" (McMullin, 1986 p.
41).

With objective countering, the individual is asked to

write down all the logical reasons for the rejections of
these beliefs. Like process constraints, the identification
of beliefs is paramount.

However, instead of just guiding

an individual to understanding the logical origins of their
beliefs as in process constraints, objective countering
prescribes how it should be done (e.g., examining each
belief in terms of the principles of inductive and deductive
logic).

Thus, the structure and actual implementation of

objective countering is much more directive than the
structure and implementation of treatment analogues derived
from self-generated attitude change.
Overall, it appears that there is theoretical agreement
between self-generated attitude change and cognitive
restructuring approaches.

For example, examination of

peoples' beliefs are important. There is also agreement that
affect is dependent on beliefs and that pathological

behavior and affect is the result of illogical beliefs.
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However, there are many conceptual and procedural
differences between self-generated attitude change and
cognitive restructuring

One general difference is the

amount of directiveness in the interventions. There are also
differences in how the change in beliefs occurs.

Thus,

there seems to be many researchable similarities and
differences between the self generated attitude change and
cognitive restructuring approaches.

Some of the speculative

comparisons between self-generated attitude change model and
cognitive restructuring might warrant future investigations.
For instance, a comparison of process constraints, RET,
self-instructional training, and objective countering might
highlight the comparative effectiveness of each strategy.
Additional research might define the precise similarities
and differences between the processes of self-generated
attitude change and other treatments.
Directions for Future Research
Thus far, in the self-generated attitude change
research, the combination of reality and process constraints
have been investigated (Leone, 1984; Leone & Baldwin, 1983;
Leone et. al., 1983).

Further exploration is needed to

establish whether one treatment analogue alone (process or
reality constraint), or the combination of both would be the
most effective in ameliorating fears.

Such research is

currently underway (Leone & Groble, 1989).
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Another useful study would be a comparison of the
interaction process and reality constraints with
verbalizing-visualizing cognitive styles.

Such a study

might compare process and reality constraints and evaluate
which one is most effective for verbalizers and visualizers.
It would be predicted that for verbalizers, process
constraints would be more effective than reality
constraints.

This prediction has a strong basis in that

verbalizers did indeed benefit more than visualizers from
the process constraint treatment analogue in this study.
Similarly, it might be predicted that for visualizers,
reality constraints might be more effective.

This

prediction assumes that with reality constraints, people
could check the reality of their distorted visual
representations.

Because reality constraints utilize the

visual representation of their fear, people who typically
use visual cognitive styles should benefit from this type of
intervention.
Before any exact conclusions can be made about
cognitive styles, this individual difference variable has to
be researched further

(e.g., what exact processes are

verbalizers and visualizers utilizing?).

Research has

indicated that verbalizing and visualizing cognitive styles
may be very flexible depending upon the context of the
treatment (Akins, Hollandsworth, Alcorn, 1983: Akins,
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Hollandsworth, & O'Connell, 1982; Stevens & Pfost, 1987) or
the context of the fear
Weerts & Lang, 1978).

(Lang, Melamed, & Hart, 1970,
Obviously, the area of cognitive

style research needs methodological improvement (e.g.,
extensive refinement of diagnostic evaluations of cognitive
styles).

Before methodological improvement can be completed

effectively, the theoretical construct of cognitive styles
needs to be clearly described.
Another issue is the participant population,

In the

present and previous studies, college participants have been
included.

Some, but perhaps not all, of these participants

could be considered part of the clinical population.

Given

additional resources, research could be conducted with
phobic people that have dehabilitating symptoms.

Perhaps,

utilizing a population that is in extreme distress instead
of a population that is in some distress might yield varied
results.
In sum, issues to be explored include comparisons of
self-generated attitude change treatment analogues to
treatments from other psychological frameworks and
comparisons of the different treatment analogues within the
self-generated attitude change model.

Additionally, the

verbal and visual cognitive styles ought to be studied with
the process and reality constraints to ascertain interaction
effects.

Finally, this study ought to be replicated with

Process Constraint
39

various populations. In conclusion, by matching different
cognitive styles with different self-generated attitude
change treatment analogues, an efficient individualized
treatment package might one day be possible.
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